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Abstract. There exist three equivalent de®nitions of perfect Nash equilibria
which di¨er in the way ``best responses against small perturbations'' are
de®ned. It is shown that applying the spirit of these de®nitions to ration-
alizability leads to three di¨erent re®nements of rationalizable strategies which
are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and trembling-hand
perfect rationalizability, respectively. We prove that weakly perfect ration-
alizability is weaker than both perfect and proper (Schuhmacher, 1995)
rationalizability and in two-player games it is weaker than trembling-hand
perfect rationalizability. By means of examples, it is shown that no other
relationships can be found.
Key words: Rationalizability, re®nements
1. Introduction
A notion like Nash equilibrium assumes common expectations of the players'
behaviour. That is, each player holds a correct conjecture about her oppo-
nents' strategy choice. But once we admit the possibility that a player may
have several strategies that she could reasonably use, conjectures and strategies
actually played may be mismatched. This is what distinguishes ration-
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and Sciences.alizability [Bernheim (1984), Pearce (1984)] from equilibrium concepts. But
rationalizability for normal-form games on its own fails to exclude some
implausible strategy choices. One example is the game given in Figure 1. It can
be shown that fX1;Y1;X1;Y2;X2;Y1;X2;Y2g are all rationalizable; in
other words, all pure strategies are possible best responses and rationalizable
in G1. However, action Y1 of player 2 is weakly dominated, and it seems
natural to assume that players do not consider such inadmissible strategies.
Therefore, one would like to have a solution concept that yields X2;Y2 as
the only solution of the game.
The notion of Nash equilibrium faces similar problems. To avoid
unreasonable outcomes, many re®nements of Nash equilibrium have been
proposed in the literature. The basic idea behind re®nements is that players
make a mistake with a small probability. For perfect Nash equilibria equiva-
lent de®nitions are obtained by either modelling these mistakes by the
requirement that each pure strategy is chosen with some minimum probabil-
ity, or by assuming that rational players make a mistake only with at most
some small probability. The de®nition of perfect rationalizability given by
Bernheim uses the ®rst approach to get a re®nement of rationalizability. We
propose a new re®nement, called weakly perfect rationalizability, by taking
the second approach. This also closes the gap to proper rationalizability
(Schuhmacher, 1995), where necessarily a de®nition using the second
approach is taken.
Related ideas are used in the de®nition of cautious rationalizability
(Pearce, 1984). A strategy of a player is said to be a cautious response if it is
a best response against a completely mixed strategy combination. Cautiously
rationalizable strategy combinations are obtained by eliminating strategies
that are not best responses ®rst, next those that are not cautious responses,
then the ones that are not best responses, and so on. Cautious rationalizability
seems to be in between rationalizability and perfect rationalizability. If one
carries the logic behind cautious rationalizability one step further, one would
like to consider a solution concept where players eliminate responses that are
not cautious in each round, which leads us to the concept of trembling-hand
perfect rationalizability. In this concept players' actions have to be best
responses also against perturbed conjectures. It is also closely related to yet
another de®nition of perfect Nash equilibrium that de®nes a perfect Nash
equilibrium as the limit point of a sequence of completely mixed strategy
combinations and being a best reply against every element in this sequence.
Based on the intuition derived from the equilibrium approach, the reader
might expect perfect rationalizability to be equivalent to weakly perfect
rationalizability and to trembling-hand perfect rationalizability. Furthermore,
one may expect these concepts to be a coarsening of proper rationalizability




Fig. 1. A two-player game: G1
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perfect rationalizability is a weaker re®nement than both perfect and proper
rationalizability. Moreover, in two-player games it holds that weakly perfect
rationalizability is a weaker re®nement than trembling-hand perfect ration-
alizability. This result is not true for games with more than two players as
will be shown by an example. For the relationship between any other two
re®nements we give examples showing that the remaining set of strategies
corresponding to the ®rst re®nement can be either smaller or larger than the
one corresponding to the second re®nement.
Contrary to equilibrium concepts, the cutting power of re®nements of
rationalizability depends very much and sometimes in unexpected ways
on how exactly mistakes and cautiousness are modelled. Trembling-hand
rationalizability is the only re®nement that is not vulnerable, in the sense of
giving di¨erent solutions, to adding strictly dominated strategies to a game.
Moreover, in many interesting examples like the burning-money game for
instance, trembling-hand perfect rationalizability has most cutting power of
all re®nements.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the rationalizability concept
and the existing re®nements, i.e. perfect rationalizability, proper ration-
alizability, and cautious rationalizability, are presented. In Section 3 we give
two new re®nements, weakly perfect rationalizability and trembling-hand
perfect rationalizability, which are obtained by applying the spirit of equiva-
lent de®nitions of perfect Nash equilibrium to rationalizability. We derive the
earlier mentioned relationships between the re®nements in Section 4, and we
show by means of examples in Section 5 that there are no other relationships.
2. Rationalizability and existing re®nements
We consider a normal-form game GI;S;U, where I is a ®nite set of players.
Each player i A I has a ®nite pure-strategy set Si and a payo¨ function Ui.W e
denote S 
Q
iAI Si and U  UiiAI. Let Mi be the set of player i's mixed
strategies and M 
Q
iAI Mi the set of mixed strategy combinations. Given
ci A Mi, we denote by cisi the probability that ci assigns to pure strategy si.
Player i's opponents in the game GI;S;U are denoted by ÿi. The notation
ÿi is also used to denote products over all players except i, for instance in cÿi
or Mÿi. As general notation, given any set X, we denote by chX the convex
hull of the set X, i.e. the smallest convex set containing X. For a subset X of a
Euclidean space, we denote by intX the relative interior of the set X.
Rationalizability [Bernheim (1984), Pearce (1984)] for normal-form games
is based on the following assumptions: (A1) the players are rational, (A2) A1 is
common knowledge among the players, and (A3) the structure of the game
(strategy sets, payo¨ functions) is common knowledge. Our formulation of
rationality is based on expected utility maximization given uncorrelated1
conjectures about the opponents' strategies. Rationalizability for normal-form
games can be de®ned by the following iterative process.
1 Correlated rationalizability, introduced by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), weakens
rationalizability because allowing correlated conjectures about the strategies of the opponents
makes more strategies rationalizable. In the paper, we only consider the case where the players
hold uncorrelated conjectures.
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Q
iAI Rk
i is inductively de®ned as
follows: ci belongs to Rk
i if ci A Mi and there is a cÿi A chRkÿ1
ÿi  such that ci is a
best response against cÿi within Mi. The set Ry  limk!yRk is the set of
rationalizable strategy pro®les.
Consider the two-player normal-form game G2 (see Figure 2) from
Myerson (1978). This game possesses two pure Nash equilibria: fX1;Y1;
X2;Y2g. Then, it is straightforward that fX1;Y1;X1;Y2;X2;Y1;
X2;Y2gHRy, so all pure strategy pro®les are rationalizable. Nonetheless,
the pure strategy pro®les X1;Y2;X2;Y1 and X2;Y2 seem unreasonable,
because they involve weakly dominated strategies.
To exclude these unreasonable outcomes, three re®nements have been
introduced in the literature: perfect rationalizability, proper rationalizability,
and cautious rationalizability.
Perfect rationalizability is due to Bernheim (1984). The idea behind the
perfectness notion is that each player makes mistakes with a small probability,
which has the consequence that every pure strategy is chosen with a positive
probability. It is assumed that these minimum probabilities are common
knowledge. Strategies are perfectly rationalizable if they are the limit of
rationalizable strategies in these perturbed games as the minimum proba-
bilities in the perturbed games converge to zero.
Given a strictly positive vector m miiAI, we denote by Mim the set of
strategies of player i that assign probabilities of at least misi > 0 to pure
strategies si of player i,s oMimf ci A Mi jcisiVmisi;Esi A Sig. Perfect
rationalizability for normal-form games is de®ned by the following iterative
procedure.
De®nition 2. Let a strictly positive vector m be given and let B0m Q
iAI Mim. For k V1, Bkm
Q
iAI Bk
i m is inductively de®ned as follows:
ci belongs to Bk
i m if ci A Mim and there is a cÿi A chBkÿ1
ÿi m such that ci is
a best response against cÿi within Mim. The set Bymlimk!yBkm is the
set of m-perfectly rationalizable strategy pro®les and By  limm!0Bym the
set of perfectly rationalizable strategy pro®les.
In De®nition 2, the set By is given by
lim
m!0 Bymf c A M jbfmtg
y
t0 ! 0; bfctg
y
t0 ! c; ct A Bymtg:
Reconsider the two-player normal-form game G2 (see Figure 2). Recall
that the pure strategy pro®les X1;Y2, X2;Y1 and X2;Y2 are ration-




Fig. 2. A two-player game: G2
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mBk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for all k > 1a n dc A B1m implies c1X2m1X2 and c2Y2m2Y2.I t
follows that X1;Y1 is the unique perfectly rationalizable strategy pro®le. As
a more general property, one can verify that weakly dominated strategies are
always eliminated by perfect rationalizability.
Schuhmacher (1995) has developed the proper rationalizability concept2.
Proper rationalizability for normal-form games is de®ned by the following
iterative procedure.
De®nition 3. Let e > 0 be given and let A0e
Q




i e is inductively de®ned as follows: ci A Ak
i e if ci belongs
to intMi and there is a cÿi A chAkÿ1
ÿi e such that for every two pure
strategies si;s0
i A Si with si a strictly better response against cÿi than s0
i, it
holds that cis0
iUecisi. The set Ayelimk!yAke is the set of e-properly
rationalizable strategy pro®les and Ay  lime!0Aye the set of properly
rationalizable strategy pro®les.
As for perfect rationalizability, the reader can verify that weakly dominated
strategies are eliminated by proper rationalizability. It is possible to give ex-
amples where the concept of proper rationalizability has more cutting power
than perfect rationalizability. Consider example G3, taken from Myerson
(1978), which highlights how the perfectness notion may fail to eliminate all
intuitively unreasonable outcomes. There are three Nash equilibria, and all
are in pure strategies; these equilibria are X1;Y1, X2;Y2, and X3;Y3.O f
these three Nash equilibria, X3;Y3 is not perfect nor proper, X2;Y2 is
perfect but not proper, and X1;Y1 is both perfect and proper. Theorem 1
states that perfect Nash equilibria are perfectly rationalizable strategy pro®les,
so X1;Y1 and X2;Y2 are perfectly rationalizable. We claim that X1;Y1 is
the unique properly rationalizable strategy pro®le of G3. Consider any
e A 0; 1
2
ÿ
. The reader may verify that
A1ef  c1;c2 A intMjc1X3Uec1X2 and c2Y3Uec2Y2g:
In addition, for c to be a member of A2e it should hold that c1X3U
ec1X1 and c2Y3Uec2Y1. And for c to be a member of A3e it is required
on top of this that c1X2Uec1X1 and c2Y2Uec2Y1. Therefore, we
have that Ay f  X1;Y1g. In the sections on general relationships between
re®nements, it will be shown that it is not always the case that Ay JBy.
Cautious rationalizability, due to Pearce (1984), imposes the condition that
the players' conjectures give positive weight to all rationalizable alternatives,
whereas the strategy pro®les that are not rationalizable should be given zero
weight. Formally, cautious rationalizability is de®ned by the following iter-
ative procedure.
De®nition 4. Let C0  M. For kV1, Ck 
Q
iAI Ck
i is inductively de®ned
as follows: ci A Ck
i if ci A Ry
i Ckÿ1 and there is a cÿi A intchRy
ÿiCkÿ1
2 The properness notion has been ®rst introduced by Myerson (1978), in the equilibrium
approach, to re®ne the perfect equilibrium concept due to Selten (1975). Schuhmacher (1995) has
shown that proper rationalizability implies the backward induction outcome for generic extensive-
form games with perfect information.
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i Ckÿ1. The set Cy 
limk!y Ck is the set of cautiously rationalizable strategy pro®les.
In De®nition 4, Ry
i Ckÿ1 is player i's set of rationalizable strategies given
that the set of players' strategy pro®les is Ckÿ1. At each step of the iterative
procedure, strategies that are not best responses are eliminated ®rst, and those
that are not cautious responses, i.e. best responses against a completely mixed
strategy pro®le, are removed next.
Let C be a solution concept, i.e. C is a function that assigns to each game a
set of solutions of that game. An important property a solution concept may
or may not satisfy is the pure strategy property.
De®nition 5. Let C be a solution concept such that CG
Q
iAI CiG for every
game G with CiGJMi. The solution concept C has the pure strategy prop-
erty if cisi > 0 for some ci A CiG implies si A CiG.
For rationalizability and its re®nements the pure strategy property is
very important. It implies that it is su½cient to know the pure strategy
combinations that are assigned as a solution to a game in order to determine
all conjectures that a player can hold.
It is not di½cult to show the following result, see also Bernheim (1984),
Pearce (1984) and Schuhmacher (1995).
Theorem 1. For every normal-form game GI;S;U:
1. The sets of rationalizable, perfectly rationalizable, properly rationalizable
and cautiously rationalizable strategy pro®les are non-empty and closed. All
of these concepts have the pure strategy property.
2. All Nash equilibria are rationalizable, all perfect equilibria are perfectly
rationalizable and all proper equilibria are properly rationalizable.
Intuitively one would expect perfect and proper rationalizability to be
re®nements of cautious rationalizability. The following example taken from




Fig. 4. A two-player game: G4
Y1 Y2 Y3
X1 1;10 ;0 ÿ9;ÿ9
X2 0;00 ;0 ÿ7;ÿ7
X3 ÿ9;ÿ9 ÿ7;ÿ7 ÿ7;ÿ7
Fig. 3. A two-player game: G3
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properly rationalizable, but it is cautiously rationalizable. However, the next
sections make clear that the set of cautiously rationalizable strategy pro®les
can be either smaller or bigger than the set of strategy pro®les obtained by any
other re®nement of rationalizability.
3. New re®nements of rationalizability
The basic idea behind re®nements of Nash equilibria is that each player makes
a mistake with a small probability. The modelling of these mistakes leads
to di¨erent, but equivalent, de®nitions of perfect Nash equilibrium. One
possibility of modelling these mistakes is to require that each pure strategy
is played with at least some minimum probability. Next one considers the
Nash equilibria of the resulting perturbed game. A perfect Nash equilibrium
is obtained as a limit point of the Nash equilibria of the perturbed games
with the probabilities converging to zero. This is exactly the line of reasoning
that has been followed to de®ne the concept of perfect rationalizability. An
equivalent de®nition for perfect Nash equilibrium, see van Damme (1991)
Theorem 2.2.5, is obtained by considering the notion of an e-perfect equilib-
rium, i.e. a strategy pro®le c A intM such that for any pure strategy si A Si
that is not a best response against cÿi it holds that cisiUe. A perfect Nash
equilibrium is a limit point of a sequence of e-perfect Nash equilibria with e
converging to zero. Recall that a related modelling of errors, which imposes
somewhat more rationality, is taken to de®ne proper Nash equilibria and
to de®ne proper rationalizability. It is therefore natural to consider the idea
of e-perfection for rationalizability and to ask the question if a re®nement of
rationalizability is obtained that is equivalent to perfect rationalizability. We
call the newly proposed re®nement weakly perfect rationalizability.
Given some e > 0, a player i satis®es the e-perfect trembling condition if,
given her conjecture cÿi A intMÿi, she plays a completely mixed strategy
ci A intMi such that for any pure strategy si A Si that is not a best response
against cÿi it holds that cisiUe. Like Schuhmacher (1995) did for proper
rationalizability, one can show that common knowledge among the players of
the e-perfect trembling condition implies that every player plays a strategy
which survives the following procedure.
De®nition 6. Let e > 0 be given and let D0eintM. For kV1, Dke Q
iAI Dk
i e is inductively de®ned as follows: ci belongs to Dk
i e if ci A intMi
and there is a cÿi A chDkÿ1
ÿi e such that cisi > e implies that si is a best
response against cÿi within Si. The set Dyelimk!yDke is the set of e-
weakly perfectly rationalizable strategy pro®les and Dy  lime!0Dye the
set of weakly perfectly rationalizable strategy pro®les.
Unlike the perfect rationalizability concept, a player is not required to
optimize against her conjecture subject to an explicit constraint on minimum
probabilities in the weakly perfect rationalizability concept. Instead her con-
jecture must put weight less than e on strategies that are not best responses.
Reconsider the two-player normal-form game G2 (see Figure 2). Remem-
ber that the seemingly unreasonable pure strategy pro®les X1;Y2, X2;Y1
and X2;Y2 are rationalizable. They are not weakly perfectly rationalizable.
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fc A intMjc1X2Ue and c2Y2Ueg. So it holds that Dy f  X1;Y1g.
Just like the concepts of perfect and proper rationalizability, it is easily veri-
®ed that in general all weakly dominated strategy pro®les are eliminated by
weakly perfect rationalizability. Game G4 is therefore an example where
cautious rationalizability eliminates less strategies than weakly perfect ration-
alizability.
A third possible, equivalent, de®nition for perfect Nash equilibria, see van
Damme (1991) Theorem 2.2.5, is the following. A perfect Nash equilibrium
is a limit point of a sequence of completely mixed strategy pro®les with the
property that it is a best reply against every element in the sequence. It follows
that a perfect Nash equilibrium is a cautious response. In the same way as
rationalizability is related to Nash equilibrium, our newly proposed concept
of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability (THR) is related to perfect Nash
equilibrium using the third de®nition. Instead of using best responses, we
require players to use cautious responses.
Another motivation which leads to the trembling-hand perfect ration-
alizability concept is obtained by carrying the logic behind cautious ration-
alizability one step further. This implicates that one wants to consider a
solution concept where players eliminate responses that are not cautious in
each round. All pure strategies that haven't been deleted yet are considered as
possible by the players, and therefore they do not use conjectures that put
probability zero on some of these strategies. THR is de®ned by the following
modi®cation of the iterative procedure of De®nition 1.
De®nition 7. Let T 0  M. For kV1, T k 
Q
iAI T k
i is inductively de®ned as
follows: ci belongs to T k
i if ci A T kÿ1
i and there is cÿi A intchT kÿ1
ÿi  such that
ci is a best response against cÿi within T kÿ1
i . The set Ty  limk!yT k is the set
of trembling-hand perfect rationalizable strategy pro®les.
At each step of the iteration, a strategy ci of player i has to be a best
response against some conjecture cÿi A intchT kÿ1
ÿi . It follows that at each
step of the iteration any weakly dominated strategy is deleted.
It is not too di½cult to show the following analogue of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. For every normal-form game GI;S;U:
1. The sets of weakly perfectly and trembling-hand perfectly rationalizable
strategy pro®les are non-empty and closed. Both concepts have the pure
strategy property.
2. All perfect Nash equilibria are weakly perfectly rationalizable.
One of the motivations for Myerson's (1978) properness notion was that
perfectness has the drawback that adding strictly dominated strategies may
enlarge the set of perfect equilibria. Nevertheless, van Damme (1991) has
shown that, for the equilibrium approach, the properness notion may su¨er
from the same drawback as well. The game G5 in Figure 5 taken from Pearce
(1984) is such an example where both the solution concepts of perfect and
proper Nash equilibrium fail to eliminate all intuitively unreasonable out-
comes. The game G5 has two pure Nash equilibria: fX2;Y1;X1;Y2g.I n
fact, these two Nash equilibria are also perfect and proper Nash equilibria. It
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are perfectly, properly, and weakly perfectly rationalizable. When the strictly
dominated strategy X3 of player 1 is removed, then X2;Y1 remains as
the only strategy pro®le that is perfectly, properly, and weakly perfectly
rationalizable. So these solution concepts are vulnerable to adding a strictly
dominated strategy. On the other hand, the mixed strategy combination sets
resulting from trembling-hand perfect rationalizability do not change when a
strictly or weakly dominated strategy is added to a game. It will be eliminated
in the ®rst iteration and does not play a role in subsequent iterations.
In many games, trembling-hand perfect rationalizability can rule out
implausible strategies that cannot be excluded by proper rationalizability (al-
though in Section 5 we show that even for two-player normal-form games
trembling-hand perfect rationalizability is not a re®nement of proper ration-
alizability). In Game G5, once we apply our concept THR, we obtain the
following: T 1chfX2;Y1;X1;Y2;X2;Y2;X1;Y1g; T 2chfX2;Y1;
X1;Y1g; T 3 f  X2;Y1g. Once player 1 will never play X3, player 2's
action Y2 is never a best response against any trembling conjecture which
puts weight on X1 and X2. Therefore, Y1 is the unique trembling-hand perfect
rationalizable strategy of player 2. Knowing that player 2's choice is Y1,
player 1's best response is to play X2 which is player 1's unique trembling-
hand perfect rationalizable strategy. Game G5 shows that sometimes it is
possible to eliminate unreasonable strategies by means of trembling-hand
perfect rationalizability which cannot be eliminated by perfect rationaliz-
ability, proper rationalizability, weakly perfect rationalizability, or even the
proper equilibrium concept since the strategy pro®le X1;Y2 constitutes a
proper equilibrium in Game G5. Also cautious rationalizability leads to the
strategy pro®le X2;Y1 in game G5, Cy f  X2;Y1g. However, as already
noted before, cautious rationalizability does not even always eliminate weakly
dominated strategies, recall for instance game G4.
4. General relationships between re®nements
Intuitively one would expect that it is possible to give some generally holding
relationships between the re®nements. Based on the experience gained from
equilibrium concepts one would expect that perfect rationalizability and
weakly perfect rationalizability coincide and that both are re®nements of
proper rationalizability. This intuition is reinforced since Theorems 1 and 2
show that the solution given by these concepts includes the strategy pro®les
selected by the corresponding equilibrium concepts. The examples given so far





Fig. 5. A two-player game: G5
Re®nements of rationalizability for normal-form games 61and that there is no general relationship between cautious rationalizability and
any of the other re®nements. The ®rst generally holding relationship shows
that perfect rationalizability implies weakly perfect rationalizability.
Theorem 3. Every perfectly rationalizable strategy pro®le is weakly perfectly
rationalizable.
Proof. Take any strictly positive vector of probabilities m small enough to
ensure that each Mim has full dimension. Let e  maxiAI maxsi A Simisi.I t
su½ces to show that Bk
i mJDk
i e for all k. We prove this by induction on k.
For k  0, it is obviously true. Now, let Bkÿ1
j mJDkÿ1
j e for all j and let
ci A Bk
i m. Then, there is cÿi A chBkÿ1
ÿi m such that ci is a best response to
cÿi within Mim. Since chBkÿ1
ÿi mJchDkÿ1




i;cÿi < cisi;cÿi it follows that ci A Dk
i e. 9
In Section 5 we will give an example showing that the converse of
Theorem 3 is not necessarily true. There exist games where the set of perfectly
rationalizable strategy pro®les is a proper subset of the set of weakly perfectly
rationalizable ones.
It is also true that proper rationalizability is a re®nement of weakly perfect
rationalizability. This is shown in the next result.
Theorem 4. Every properly rationalizable strategy pro®le is weakly perfectly
rationalizable.
Proof. Take any e A 0;1 and any player i A I. It su½ces to show that
Ak
i eJDk
i e for all k. We prove this by induction on k. For k  0, this
is true since A0
i eD0
i e. Now, let Akÿ1
j eJDkÿ1
j e for all j and let ci A
Ak
i e. Then it is straightforward that ci A Dk
i e. 9
The converse of Theorem 4 is not true. In game G3 it holds that Ay is a
proper subset of By, and in Theorem 3 it is shown that always By JDy.
We have already seen that in game G5 trembling-hand perfect
rationalizability is a more powerful re®nement than perfect and proper
rationalizability. Therefore, we might expect that trembling-hand perfect
rationalizable strategy pro®les are also weakly perfectly rationalizable, and
possibly even that they are perfectly or properly rationalizable. The latter
statement is shown to be false in Section 5. Theorem 5 shows that the former
statement is true for two-player games. We denote the pure strategies in T k
i
by ST k
i , and the pure strategies that are approximately in Dk
i e by SDk
i e.
So, SDk




Theorem 5. For any two-player game in normal-form, every trembling-hand
perfect rationalizable strategy pro®le is weakly perfectly rationalizable.
Proof. Let e  1=maxiAIaSi. First we will show by induction on k that
ST k
i JSDk
i e, for all e A 0;e. It is easily veri®ed that ST 0
i  SD0
i eSi.
Now, let ST kÿ1
j JSDkÿ1
j e for all j.I fs1
i A ST k
i , then there is c1
j A
intchT kÿ1






i A SinST kÿ1
i such that Uis
i ;c1
j  > Uis1
i ;c1
j . Let S
i be the set of all
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j ,s oS
i JSinST kÿ1
i . Let l be the maximal integer
such that S
i XST lÿ1
i 0q. Since c1
j A chT kÿ1
j JchT lÿ1
j  and each pure
strategy in S
i XST lÿ1
i is a best response to c1
j , at least one pure strategy in
S
i XST lÿ1
i is a best response within T lÿ1
i to a su½ciently small perturbation
of c1
j that gives positive weight to each pure strategy in T lÿ1
j . Therefore, S
i X
ST l
i 0q, a contradiction. Consequently, Uis1
i ;c1
j VUisi;c1
j , for every si A
Si.3 Since s1
i A ST 1
i , there is c2




every si A Si. It follows that Uis1
i ;1 ÿ ec1
j  ec2
j VUisi;1 ÿ ec1
j  ec2
j ,
for every si A Si. Moreover, 1 ÿ ec1
j  ec2
j is a completely mixed strategy
putting weight less than e on each pure strategy in SjnST kÿ1
j KSjnSDkÿ1
j e,
j 0i, where the induction hypothesis is used for the inclusion. It follows
that 1 ÿ ec1
j  ec2
j A chDkÿ1
j e. So, c1
i A Dk
i e where c1




i e. We have shown that ST k
i JSDk
i e:
Since the sets T k
i and Dk
i e can only change in the next iteration if the sets
ST k
i and SDk
i e change, it follows that Ek;l Vm 
P
iAIaSi ÿ 1, T k






i , then c0
i A T k
i with k Vm  1, so there is c3
j A
intchT k




j . Since c0
i A T 1
i ,
there is c4
j A intMj such that Uic0
i;c4
j VUisi;c4
j , Esi A Si. As in the ®rst
part of the proof it follows that 1 ÿ ec3
j  ec4
j A chDk
j e and that c0
i is a
best response against this strategy. So, c00
i eADk
i eDy















The proof of Theorem 5 is only valid for the two-player case since it relies
on the linearity of Uisi;. Theorem 5 cannot be generalized to three or more
player games as is shown by Game G6 (see Figure 6). It is easily seen that
ST 1
1 f X1;X2;X3g, ST 1
2 f Y1;Y2g, and ST 1
3 f Z1;Z2g. It is not possible
in the ®rst iteration to eliminate any pure strategy of player 1, since all
strategies of player 1 are equally good against c2;c3  1=3;1=3;1=3;
1=3;1=3;1=3. In the second iteration it is clearly impossible to eliminate
any other pure strategy of player 2 or 3. Against c2;c3  1=2;1=2;0;
1=2;1=2;0 all pure strategies of player 1 are equally good, so no further
3 One of the referees had a nice induction argument to show the similar result that if cÿi A
chT kÿ1
ÿi  and ci A T kÿ1
i is a best response to cÿi in T kÿ1
i , then ci is also a best response to cÿi in
Mi.
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y1 Y2 Y3
X1 2;1;11 ;1;10 ;0;1 X1 1;1;10 ;1;10 ;0;1 X1 1;1;01 ;1;00 ;0;0
X2 0;1;11 ;1;10 ;0;1 X2 1;1;12 ;1;10 ;0;1 X2 1;1;01 ;1;00 ;0;0
X3 2;1;10 ;1;1 0;0;1 X3 0;1;12 ;1;10 ;0;1 X3 0;1;00 ;1;02 ;0;0
Z1 Z2 Z3
Fig. 6. A three-player game: G6
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1 f X1;X2;X3g,
ST k
2 f Y1;Y2g, and ST k
3 f Z1;Z2g:
Now we consider the weakly perfect rationalizability concept. Let any e
smaller than 1=3 be given. Obviously, in the ®rst iteration again only the pure




3ef Z1;Z2g. In the second iteration, it is again impossi-
ble to eliminate any other pure strategy of player 2 or 3. We show that pure
strategy X3 of player 1 is eliminated in the second iteration, although it is
easily seen that X3 is not weakly dominated by any mixed strategy. Intuitively,
compared to strategies X1 and X2, strategy X3 is good against the conjectures
Y1;Z1, Y2;Z2, and Y3;Z3, but bad against all other pure strategy
combinations. If every pure strategy is played with at least a small probability,
then the pure strategy combinations against which strategy X3 is bad will
necessarily arise with positive probability. It turns out that against any such
conjecture at least one of the pure strategies X1 and X2 performs better. Let
any c2 A chD1
2e and any c3 A chD1
3e be given. To simplify notation, let
s and t denote the probability of the ®rst action of player 2 and player 3,
respectively, and b and g the probability of the third action of player 2 and
player 3, respectively, so s  c2Y1, t  c3Z1, b  c2Y3Ue, and g 
c3Z3Ue. Let us consider the payo¨s of the pure strategies of player 1 (see
Table 1).
Pure strategy X3 is at least as good as pure strategy X1 if t3 ÿ 3b
s3 ÿ 3g3gU4st  5bg 2 ÿ 2b. So, if,
3 ÿ 3g ÿ 4t > 0 and sU
3b ÿ 3t ÿ 3g ÿ 2b  2  5bg
3 ÿ 3g ÿ 4t
1
or
3 ÿ 3g ÿ 4t < 0 and sV
3b ÿ 3t ÿ 3g ÿ 2b  2  5bg
3 ÿ 3g ÿ 4t
:
If 3 ÿ 3g ÿ 4t  0, then X3 is strictly worse than X1. Consider the case 3ÿ
3g ÿ 4t < 0. It only holds that the right-hand side, i.e. the minimum proba-
bility to be put on strategy Y1, is less than 1 ÿ b if t > 1 ÿ 2bg=1 ÿ b. But
then t  g > 1ÿbgÿ3bg=1ÿb > 1 since b < 1=3, a contradiction since
the sum of t and g should be strictly less than 1. So only case (1) remains.
Pure strategy X3 is at least as good as X2 if t1 ÿ bs1 ÿ g
gU4st  3bg. So, if,
1 ÿ g ÿ 4t > 0 and sU
3bgÿ g ÿ 1 ÿ bt
1 ÿ g ÿ 4t
Table 1. The payo¨s of the pure strategies of player 1
Strategy Payo¨
X1 2st  1 ÿ s ÿ bt  s1 ÿ t ÿ gg1 ÿ b
X2 1 ÿ s ÿ bt  s1 ÿ t ÿ g21 ÿ s ÿ b1 ÿ t ÿ gg1 ÿ b
X3 2st  21 ÿ s ÿ b1 ÿ t ÿ g2bg
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1 ÿ g ÿ 4t < 0 and sV
3bgÿ g ÿ 1 ÿ bt
1 ÿ g ÿ 4t
: 2
If 1 ÿ g ÿ 4t  0, then X3 is strictly worse than action X2. Consider the case
where 1 ÿ g ÿ 4t > 0. It holds that the numerator of the right-hand side is
negative (use that b < 1=3), a contradiction since s should be positive. So only
case (2) remains.
Concluding, X3 might be a best response of player 1 if
1 ÿ g ÿ 4t < 0 < 3 ÿ 3g ÿ 4t
and
3bgÿ g ÿ 1 ÿ bt
1 ÿ g ÿ 4t
UsU
3b ÿ 3t ÿ 3g ÿ 2b  2  5bg
3 ÿ 3g ÿ 4t
:
Next it is shown that the latter inequality can never be satis®ed since the
®rst term is always bigger than the third. Now, 1 ÿ g ÿ 4t < 0 < 3 ÿ 3g ÿ 4t
and 3bgÿgÿ1ÿbt=1ÿgÿ4tU3bÿ3tÿ3gÿ2b  25bg=3ÿ3gÿ4t
implies
t24 ÿ 4bt4b ÿ 4  4g ÿ 4bg1 ÿ b ÿ g ÿ bg 2bg2 U0: 3
The left-hand side of (3) is a quadratic function in t. Computing ``b2 ÿ 4ac'' to
®nd the zero points of this function yields 16gg ÿ 11 ÿ 4b  3b
2 which is
smaller than 0 (use b < 1=3). Therefore, the quadratic function in t has no
zero points. By trying any value of the parameters, one sees that the left-hand
side of (3) is actually positive everywhere, leading to a contradiction. There
are no values of s and t, given any b;g < 1=3, for which X3 is the best response
and X3 can be eliminated. After this no further eliminations are possible.









5.1. Two more examples
The ®rst example, G7, is due to Bo Èrgers (1994). Figure 7 gives us the payo¨
matrix of this two-player normal-form game. In G7, player 1's pure strategies
or actions X1;X2;X3 and player 2's actions Y1;Y2;Y3 are properly, trembling-
hand perfect, and cautiously rationalizable. Meanwhile, only player 1's
actions X1;X2 and player 2's actions Y1;Y2;Y3 are perfectly rationalizable in
G7. Perfect rationalizability eliminates pure strategy X3 in G7. Given both
examples G7 and G3, we conclude that there is no relationship between perfect
rationalizability and these other re®nements (proper, trembling-hand perfect,
and cautious rationalizability): perfect rationalizability may be weaker (ex-
ample G3) or even stronger (example G7).
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gives us the payo¨ matrix of G8. In G8, proper and cautious rationalizability
single out a unique strategy pro®le: X1;Y2. Nevertheless, player 2's action
Y1 is trembling-hand perfect rationalizable: Ty
1 f X1g and Ty
2  M2.
Therefore, there is no relationship between trembling-hand perfect ration-
alizability and proper or cautious rationalizability: trembling-hand perfect
rationalizability may be weaker (Example G8) or stronger (Examples G4 and
G5).
5.2. The burning money game
Before concluding we brie¯y consider Ben-Porath and Dekel's (1992) burning
money game to get more insight into the consequences of using a particular
re®nement. This two-stage game is based on an idea of van Damme (1989). In
the ®rst stage, player 1 has a choice between burning money (action B) and
not burning money (action N). After this choice is observed, player 1 and 2
play a simultaneous-move game of coordination (actions X1 or X2 for player 1
and actions Y1 or Y2 for player 2). The corresponding normal-form of this
game is given in Figure 9.
For this burning money game, trembling-hand perfect rationalizability
singles out a unique strategy pro®le: NX1;Y1Y1; that is, the fact that player
1 could have chosen to burn utility but did not do so ensures that she obtains
her most preferred outcome. Indeed, in the game G9, once we apply our
concept THR, we obtain the following iterative deletion of pure strategies:
BX2 B ST 1
1; Y2Y1;Y2Y2 B ST 2
2; BX2;NX2 B ST 3
1; Y2Y1;Y2Y2;Y1Y2 B ST 4
2 
fY1Y1g; BX1;BX2;NX2 B ST 5
1 f NX1g; T 5 f  NX1;Y1Y1g. Nevertheless,
Y1 Y2 Y3
X1 3;01 ;00 ;0
X2 0;01 ;03 ;0
X3 2;00 ;02 ;0
X4 0;30 ;20 ;0
X5 0;00 ;20 ;3





Fig. 8. A two-player game: G8
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able. Indeed, A1e is such that for all c1;c2 A A1
1eA1
2e : c1BX2U
ec1NX1 and c1BX2Uec1NX2. Given these restrictions, for each pure
strategy of player 2 there exists a conjecture c1 A A1
1e such that it is a best
response against c1. Indeed, for all c1 A A1
1e, player 2's expected payo¨s are:
U2c1;Y1Y1c1BX1c1NX1; U2c1;Y1Y2c1BX15c1NX2;
U2c1;Y2Y15c1BX2c1NX1 U 1  5ec1NX1; U2c1;Y2Y2
5c1BX25c1NX2U5  5ec1NX2. For example, for all e A 0;1,
each pure strategy of player 2 is a best response against the conjecture
c1 A A1
1e de®ned by c1BX1e=61  1=5e; c1BX2  1=5e=
611=5e, c1NX15=61  1=5e; c1NX21=611=5e. For
each pure strategy of player 1 belonging to fBX1;NX1;NX2g there exists
a conjecture c2 A A2
2e such that it is a best response against c2. For
example, each pure strategy belonging to fBX1;NX1;NX2g is a best response
against the conjecture c2 AA1
2e de®ned by c2Y1Y11=12, c2Y1Y2
29=60, c2Y2Y11=12;c2Y2Y27=20. Then, the sets of properly rationali-
zable strategies are the limit sets Ay
1 IfBX1;NX1;NX2g and Ay
2 I
fY1Y1;Y1Y2;Y2Y1;Y2Y2g; only player 1's pure strategy BX2 does not belong
to Ay
1 . Note that NX1;Y1Y1 is also the unique cautiously rationalizable
Y1Y1 Y1Y2 Y2Y1 Y2Y2
BX1 3;13 ;1 ÿ2;0 ÿ2;0
BX2 ÿ2;0 ÿ2;0 ÿ1;5 ÿ1;5
NX1 5;10 ;05 ;10 ;0
NX2 0;01 ;50 ;01 ;5
Fig. 9. Ben-Porath and Dekel's burning money game: G9
Table 2. The (no)-relationships between the re®nements




Perfect  Ex. G7 Ex. G4 Theorem 3 Ex. G7
Fig. 7 Fig. 4 Fig. 7
Proper Ex. G3 Ex. G4 Ex. G8
Fig. 3  Fig. 4 Theorem 4 Fig. 8
Cautious Ex. G5 Ex. G5 Ex. G5 Ex. G8
Fig. 5 Fig. 5  Fig. 5 Fig. 8
Weakly Ex. G4 Ex. G6











Re®nements of rationalizability for normal-form games 67strategy pro®le, with 5;1 as the resulting payo¨s. Therefore, trembling-hand
perfect and cautious rationalizability single out the outcome of forward in-
duction [see Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992), Hammond (1993), van Damme
(1989)], while proper rationalizability (or weakly perfect rationalizability or
perfect rationalizability) does not.
5.3. Conclusion
We conclude by summarizing the (no)-relationships between the re®nements
of rationalizability for normal-form games (see Table 2). The interpretation of
an entry in the matrix is that the solution provided by a concept in the row is a
subset of the solution provided by a concept in the column.
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